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In recent years, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has undergone a religious 
renaissance. The previously stable distinctions between the religious and the secular, 
sacred and profane, and ontology and theology have been de-centered by a resurgence 
of interest in religion, culture and identity. This is reflected not only in the proliferation 
of studies focusing on the rise of religious violence in various parts of the world (and its 
capacity for peacebuilding) but also in efforts more generally to locate religion in IR 
itself as one of the constitutive elements of the discipline. Religion, broadly defined, 
may be seen to have been present in the foundations of the contemporary 
(European-based) international order at the Peace of Westphalia and greatly influenced 
the “expansion of international society” through the “civilizing mission” of modern 
colonialism. It was also, as Weber reminded us over a century ago, present in the 
development of capitalism as the dominant mode of production in the West. 
Consequently, the globalization of capitalism and the Westphalian states system or 
international community of territorialized nation-states has posed profound existential 
challenges for societies with very different faith traditions and cosmologies.  
 
The “religious resurgence” in IR can be traced back not only to 9/11 and the ensuing 
“War on Terror” but to the globalization of transnational religious identities. Much of 
the literature on religion and IR has narrowly focused on “Islamic exceptionalism” and, 
specifically, the security threats posed by “Islamic” terrorism. For explanatory IR 
theories, the pathologies of religion in general and Islam in particular constitute a 
problem to be contained by the “international community” through the establishment of 
secular security architectures which stress the importance of state-building, liberal 
peacebuilding and human rights. Realists favour the establishment of strong secular 
states capable of “securitizing” the threats posed by transnational religious movements 
from within their borders with the help of the “international community”. Liberals 
believe that these secular state structures need to be legitimized through periodic 
elections, the establishment of human rights mechanisms and the rule of law, the 
so-called “Liberal Peace” (Doyle 2005). States are furthermore reminded of their 
“responsibility to protect” their citizens from religious-inspired extremist violence 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Failure to do 
so opens up the possibility of intervention by “the international community” in the form 
of periodic air-strikes. 
 
Critical accounts, most particularly those influenced by postcolonial framings, 
problematize the representation of Islamic societies in mainstream IR discourse as 
“orientalist” (Said 1978). However, efforts to “provincialize” (Chakrabarty 2000) IR by 
bringing in voices from “outside” the West have hitherto privileged the secular. This is 
noticeably the case with Marxist-inspired Critical Theory and its application to security 
studies and international political economy. Capitalism, the source of so-much 
insecurity today, is understood following Marx as a secular mode of production, 
abstracted from the cultural and social milieu. Critical Security Studies conceives of 
security as emancipation (Booth 1991, 2005) from various forms of structural and 
cultural violence represented by “religion”. The atomized, unencumbered individual, 
unburdened by attachments imposed by membership of cultural and political 
communities, is similarly considered to be the main referent object of Human Security 
discourse, including attempts to steer Human Security in a more “critical” direction 
(Shani 2014) as will be discussed below. 
 
However, critical theory has opened up space for the “return” of religion to IR through 
the deployment of “religion as critique” (Mendieta 2005). Viewed as a fundamental part 
of the “lifeworld”, religion was pressed into the service of critical theory to rescue 
“reason” from the fetishism and idolatry of technology and the market. It was in the 
realm of “religion” that the “human” lived on. Yet capitalism itself was seen by 
Benjamin among others as religion in that it “essentially serves to satisfy the same 
worries, anguish and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion” (Benjamin in 
Mendieta 2005). Constructivist accounts open up space for the “return of religion” by 
focusing on the role of norms in IR but have hitherto failed to engage in religion per se. 
Poststructuralist approaches do so but tend to reduce faith-based claims to power 
relations. 
 
More recently, attempts inspired by critical theory – in a broad sense – have been made 
to emancipate IR from its dominant secular moorings through an encounter with the 
“post-secular” which has opened up potentially productive avenues of inquiry.  For 
Jürgen Habermas (2008), the term “post-secular” refers to the inclusion of 
religious-based world-views, translated into a language accessible to all, into the public 
sphere so as to guarantee its’ neutrality. Recent critical scholarship has cast doubt on the 
extent to which translation is possible without doing violence to the ‘vital core’ of faith  
(Shani 2014) and how the inclusion of religious-based worldviews necessitates an 
essentialization of fluid faith-based traditions, in turn reifying religious boundaries and 
empowering unrepresentative elites to speak on behalf of religion, “religion-making” 
(Dressler and Mandair 2011). Attempts to apply the post-secular to IR are still in their 
infancy (Petito and Mavelli 2012) but have taken the form of an engagement with 
culturally constituted difference (Pasha 2013). Most, however, have limited this 
engagement to the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) leaving other 
cosmologies unexplored.  
 
In the remaining section, I will attempt to briefly sketch a post-secular approach to 
Human Security. Two decades ago the United Nations Development Program 
introduced the concept of Human Security as safety from existential threats posed by 
hunger, disease and repression as an alternative to rampant neo-liberal globalization, 
which prioritizes the needs of markets over people, and conventional approaches to 
security, which continue to prioritize the needs of states over citizens (UNDP 1994). 
Despite its institutionalization in the United Nations system, Human Security- redefined 
by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution as “the right of people to live in 
freedom and dignity” (United Nations General Assembly 2012)-has failed to make 
significant inroads into the hegemony of the “national security paradigm” and has been 
co-opted into a neo-liberal world order based on ontological and methodological 
individualism.   
 
Critically reworked, I have argued “human security” has the potential to constitute a 
powerful global ethic by engaging with the multiple religio-cultural contexts in which 
human dignity is embedded. Human security in lower case opens up the possibility of 
conceptualizing ‘security’ from multiple culturally informed perspectives of which the 
cosmopolitan liberal tradition is merely one. This entails locating the emancipatory 
impulse of contemporary Western-led attempts to liberate human beings everywhere 
from fear and poverty not in universal entitlements to security and freedom but in the 
“civilizing mission” of the Christian tradition and possibly in other traditions? 
 
Christians affirm that all human beings have a “natural right” to be treated equally since 
we are all created in the image of God (Imago Dei). Although it could be argued that the 
end result is the same – equal entitlements to freedom from fear and want – individuals, 
in the Christian tradition, cannot be the ultimate source of agency and autonomy. 
Roman Catholicism in particular considers Imago Dei to be foundational and grounds 
its post-Vatican II defence of human rights in the concept. Similarly, Islam holds that 
security resides not in individual autonomy and rationality but in our equal submission 
to the divine will of Allah. Those who submit form the umma, the universal community 
of believers. Muslims hold the Qu’ran to be the ultimate source of truth and relations 
between Muslims are regulated by Shar’ia Law. Space, however, is allocated in Islamic 
law for itjihad, independent judicial reasoning, and interpretation of the Quran.  
 
Indic religio-cultural traditions, however, have a different cosmology from the 
Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and lack a central revealed text 
such as the Qu’ran, Torah or Bible. In South Asia, the collection of local faiths 
subsumed under the term ‘Hinduism’ have as their central concern the concept of 
dharma. Dharma governs all legitimate world ends (purushartha), prescribing different 
rights and duties for different ‘castes.’ Ontological security resides in following one’s 
karma, the application of dharma to individual action. Karma in turn determines the 
cycle of birth, death and rebirth (samsara). Brahmans and other ‘twice-born’ castes have 
more ‘security’ than those of other castes as they are nearer to achieving moksha 
(liberation from suffering). There is, therefore, in Hinduism, a ‘hierarchy of protection’ 
(Brekke 2013). In Buddhism as in Hinduism, dharma is seen as the provider of 
protection, and thus, ontological security rests with following one’s karma. However, 
nirvana (liberation from suffering) is possible through individual meditation or as part 
of a community, sangha. In Sikhism, dharam (a variant of dharma) guides action and 
liberation can be achieved through the recitation of the ‘true name’ (Satnaam). However, 
the communal aspect of religious identity is emphasized through the wearing of the five 
external symbols of faith making a distinction between the ‘religious’ community 
(Khalsa) and ‘nation’ (qaum) difficult (Shani 2007). Gender equality is particularly 
emphasized in Sikhism whereas Buddhism extends the principle of equality to all 
sentient beings while questioning the uniqueness of individual identity through the 
doctrine of anatman (no self). Although this discussion was necessarily brief and drawn 
almost exclusively from the traditions with which I am most familiar, it serves to 
illustrate the main point of this brief paper; that religion can act as a form of security 
and that, furthermore, contemporary understandings of security are drawn almost 
exclusively from a particular tradition: the Judeo-Christian. 
 
Three central concepts of modernity, which are constitutive of IR, have their origins in 
this tradition. First, the concept of the nation as an ethnic community has its origins in 
the Jewish idea of a “chosen people” transformed into a “community of blood” by 
Christianity through the act of transubstantiation. By partaking of Jesus’s flesh and 
blood through the Eucharist, Christians formed a distinct “nation” or “race” which could 
be differentiated from others (Anidjar 2014). Second, the state, as Schmitt has argued, 
may be seen as a “secularized” theological concept. Schmitt based his understanding of 
the ‘sovereign’ on the founding father of the ‘realist tradition’: Thomas Hobbes. Central 
to Hobbes’s thought is a view of the sovereign as a Leviathan, a secularized ‘Mortal[l] 
God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense’ (Hobbes [1651] 
1985, 227). This ‘Mortal[l] God’ alone is capable of bestowing protection on his 
subjects in return for their liberty. Finally, the development of capitalism, as Weber 
pointed out, cannot be understood in Europe without reference to the Protestant work 
ethic and, more recently, as Anidjar has recently pointed out, to the concept of 
circulation, which has its origins in the flow of Blood in Christ’s body.  
 
This collection of essays, based on a roundtable at the International Studies Association 
Annual Convention held at New Orleans which I chaired with Mustapha Kamal Pasha,
1
 
builds upon Carl Schmitt’s insight that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of 
the state are secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt 1985:1) by critically examining 
the ontological and epistemological foundations of IR in general and security studies in 
particular in the Judeo-Christian tradition and more specifically in a Protestant 
world-view (Hurd 2008). If, as Jack Snyder (2011:1) has recently argued, “mainstream 
                                                   
1 It also forms the basis for a book series, Critical Perspectives on Religion in 
International Politics, which we edit for Rowman and Littlefield International. For 
more details, see here: 
http://www.rowmaninternational.com/series/critical-perspectives-religion-international-
politics. 
international relations scholars find it difficult to integrate religious subject matter into 
their normal conceptual frameworks”, it is suggested here that this might be because 
their “normal” conceptual frameworks are themselves secularized theological 
frameworks. 
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political economy.  His two books (with Naeem Inayatullah), International Relations 
and the Problem of Difference (Routledge, 2004) and Savage Economics: Wealth, 
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One of international relations’ (IR) patron saints, Martin Wight, once posed the question, 
“International Relations is a theodicy?  Discuss,” on an MA exam.  My source, 
Zdenek Kavan, assures me no one opted for this question.  I see my task, however 
belatedly and out of context, as opting for Wight’s question.  My answer at present 
takes the form of a sketch or, perhaps, a promissory note.
2
 
It might seem obvious that IR in its realist variants may be little more than a theodicy, 
an attempt to explain the necessity of conflict and war to order itself.  Wight’s 
references (1992, 16) to Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society as involving “the 
frank acceptance of the disagreeable side of life” might restrict our attribution of 
theodicy to realism, but I argue against that reading.  Where Wight (1992, 18-20) 
explores the application of “mechanistic” and “biological” theory to international 
                                                   
2 For a book, tentatively titled Justified Suffering: From Classical Political Economy to 
IPE. 
politics, he opens the door wider.  Mechanistic theories of balances and equilibrium 
have served realists and those he calls rationalists – from balance of power to trade and 
credit balances.  And, Wight notes, balance and equilibrium occupy an ambiguous 
moral status, signalling the limits of international politics but also allotted a normative 
power linked to theories of cooperation, reciprocity and human improvement.  
Although Wight associates biological theories, in this case Darwin or Spencer, with 
racist theories of competition, we might easily associate them also with the mechanistic 
(and ostensibly de-racialized) theories of progress, which tend also to explain why some 
must bear the costs of progress.  If so, then answering the question about IR Theory as 
theodicy requires casting a wider net across the field....   
Since I write as principally as a political economist, my thinking attends principally to 
the theodicies involved in classical political economy, neoclassical economics and their 
translation into strands of IR theorizing.  I can only paint that project in very broad 
strokes here..  First, I will discuss what I call the symbolic structure of theodicy.  
Second, I will briefly present three examples/moments, one drawing on Hegel, a second 
on Adam Smith, the third focusing on rationalist IPE, that stand in for a more 
comprehensive and systematic reading of the political economy tradition. 
The Symbolic Structure of Early Modern Theodicy 
Theology becomes theodicy when focused on the problem of pervasive and inexplicable 
suffering and evil in a creation that God saw as “very good” (Siebert 2010, 13-15). The 
“problem” of theodicy emerges because suffering and evil appear as an anomaly whose 
existence must be accepted but simultaneously denied: accepted, on the one hand, 
because evil’s presence in the world motivates the theologians task, and maybe the 
theorist’s task more generally) of constructing the aspiration for and means towards the 
good; denied, on the other, because its existence implies an imperfection in God’s 
creation of the natural order and therefore an imperfection or incompleteness in God.  
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430), stands in for the Christian tradition of theodicy 
for many thinkers (Griffin 1976; Connolly 1991), but Leibniz, who coins the term 
(Rutherford 1995, 18) in Theodicy (2007 [1710]),
3
, serves better to illustrate the features 
of a modern political economic theology.
4
   
 
Pierre Bayle plays a key role in this story, when he reintroduces Manicheanism into 
public discussion after a several-century-long absence.  For thinkers committed to both 
an intelligible and orderly world, perhaps on Newton’s model, and (officially at least) 
                                                   
3 Hereafter, TH. 
4 And often following Augustine  (see TH 303-6), 
Christian doctrine, Bayle’s challenge that they could not have both – that the experience 
of evil and suffering requires a dualism of good and evil forces independently at work— 
“startled” them by throwing Christianity into doubt (Popkin 1967, 32).  Thus, Cassirer 
(1955, 136, 143-8) argues that the key intellectual problems engaging Enlightenment 
thinkers were “fused with religious problems;” and none was more troubling than how 
to reconcile a vision of creation as simple and harmonious with the disorderly “facts of 
human experience,” a problem of theodicy to which “they recur untiringly.”  While 
some, like Hume, thinks beyond Christian doctrine, opting for a vision of an orderly but 
valueless universe (Popkin 1967, 49-51), Leibniz rises to defend God’s orderly creation.   
 
In Theodicy, Leibniz acknowledges the force of Bayle’s argument, but he pushes back 
against dualism, by insisting nothing escapes God’s will.  At the same time, he denies 
that this good God is “the author of sin” and “misery,” though a wise God must have 
foreseen the consequences of creating and knowingly allowed evil; as Leibniz puts it, 
God is not the cause, he “simply permits it” (Th, 63). This move seems to open a crack 
between God’s perfection and his creation’s capacity to choose evil and cause suffering.  
Leibniz recognizes, even embraces this gap, as Rutherford (1995, 7) notes, because the 
creation – as an emanation of God’s will – cannot be identical to God and therefore 
suffers a “privation,” or is  “limited in its essence,” containing “an original 
imperfection” (Th 139, 144-5). God’s identity requires a created other that, being less in 
form and order, is separate from God, but still can mirror God’s goodness because it 
remains a good creation in its separateness.
5
  Yet this necessarily created privation in 
being leads to additional privations, chains of choices and actions that result in evil and 
suffering, somehow set at a distance from God (Th 146, 161, 219, 306).  As many 
contemporary theologians admit (Siebert 2010, 14-5), such reasoning appears tortured; 
cracks in its symbolic structure make theodicy both necessary and impossible.
6
 
 
But Leibniz cannot leave this issue only tenuously resolved.  Like Augustine before 
him (see Griffin 1976, 69-71), he works to characterize evil as only an apparent 
anomaly, playing a central role, even sometimes mysterious to us, in creation’s harmony 
(Rutherford 1995, 9).   The wise and good architect brings together diverse elements 
in “the most fitting plan” (Th, 168).  As Rutherford (1995, 13-4) explains, Leibniz sees 
                                                   
5 Weber (1963, 138-9) notes that “the legitimation of every distinctively ethical 
prophecy has always required the notion of a god characterized by attributes that set 
him sublimely above the world,” but “the more the development tends toward the 
conception of a transcendental unitary god who is universal, the more there arises the 
problem of how the extraordinary power of such a god may be reconciled with the 
imperfection of the world that he (sic) has created and rules over.” 
6 Zizek 2008, 319) calls this the Real: the “internal traumatic core of a symbolic order, 
including one organized around God: “it is a totality inherent to the Symbolic, its 
immanent crack or impossibility.” 
creation as uniting “a variety of things into a pleasing whole.”  Though each element 
and creature appears as a “finite instantiation” and therefore limited, and less perfect in 
form than we might desire, the whole, Leibniz insists, is the best possible combination 
of these diverse elements.  By “optimizing” the highest values – “richness in variety in 
phenomena, and simplicity of laws” -- God’s creation expresses a harmony of laws and 
rules, “nature and grace,” and past and future that are consistent with and can be 
apprehended by the highest reason (Th, 160, 261, 344-5; Rutherford 1995, 22-4, 29). 
   
Indeed, Leibniz assures us that what we see as “disorder in the part is order in the whole” 
(Th, 204).  It is the capacity to appreciate and live according to this harmony that 
produces the greatest happiness possible for creatures (Th 192; Rutherford 1995, 52-4).  
The apparent disorder of suffering serves not only “as a penalty owing to guilt,” but as a 
“means,” guiding individuals by example and contributing to a “greater perfection” (Th 
140).  This tight “connection” of punishment and reward and “bad or good action” 
exemplifies this “pre-established harmony” (Th 166).  But, ultimately, the continuing 
presence of evil and suffering requires an act of divine redemption that unfolds in 
history (Th, 129).  Here, as Blumenfeld (1995, 404-5) explains, grace unfolds along 
with nature, evil redeemed by the good in the end.  The ontological fracture is given a 
temporal solution; the very fracturing of the social order—the presence of evil—appears 
as the cause of a plan for redemption.
7
  Thus, evil only appears as truly evil from our 
limited point of view. 
 
A secularized theodicy responds to the fundamental fracture in the (natural) order in a 
similar fashion.  We are tempted to displace evil and suffering outside of the given 
order in order to preserve its goodness and order; walling off the good from these alien 
and disruptive forces seems to secure the symbolic order’s harmony.  But this act of 
displacement also does what Leibniz resists: it creates a space beyond God’s given order.  
Alternative spaces would be opened; other logics of life would be on offer.   
 
Preserving the harmony of order -- its completeness and lawfulness -- requires placing 
evil and suffering within, but social order now is revealed as fractured internally: evil 
and suffering confront the goodness of social order as an internal antagonism.  
Restoring the goodness and power of creation requires a theodicy that turns (apparent) 
evil into the good by revaluing social ills and moral failings as good, though doubts 
                                                   
7 As Weber (1963, 139; see also 142) writes, the problem of evil in the world may be 
addressed via “messianic eschatologies,” by a “future revolution in this world,” in which 
evil and good would be again assigned their rightful places.  For Zizek (2008, 345), the 
relationship between evil and its covering by a promise of redemption is tighter.  Evil 
calls the Good forward: God’s plan for redemption appears as a suturing of the 
fracture—as a domestication of force of the immanent impossibility of the good. 
remain or by showing that these ills and failings are justified when they support or can 
be turned to the good of the social order, conceived variously and simultaneously as 
harmony, retributive justice, and historical deliverance.  The world’s riven-ness 
appears, then, possibly as tragedy, but always one smoothed by invisible hands and 
mechanisms of historical progress.  But this revaluation and temporalization of the 
problem merely cover the ontological cracks in social order.  Social ills and moral 
failings remain immune to complete revaluation or smoothing by the invisible hand in 
the present or in some future state.  We are drawn to acts of disavowal of social evil 
when it appears that the theodicical covering can never be complete.  In this way, 
theodicy reveals a fracture in an order even as it covers over that fracture.  Moral or 
social evil serves as a “constitutive outside” in Timothy Mitchell’s (2000, 4-5, 12-3) 
sense, or a “structural necessity” that is paradoxically outside but necessary to a 
symbolic order in Zizek’s (1994, 306).  
 
Reading Political Economy as Theodicy 
 
As with Leibniz, early modern political economy begins with the assumption of a 
(mostly) good, or at least orderly and rationally explicable natural order.  As Milbank 
(1993, 40) suggests, for the political economist, “God-Nature” places dispositions in 
human beings, whose operations unfold in a regular fashion and “result in an overall 
harmony.”  Against that presumption of harmony, I will comment briefly on three 
thinkers or thought systems. 
 
First, for Hegel, private and public, civil society and state are joined in a totality, 
dialectally bridged by a process of learning (Hegel 1967, especially Part 3; see also 
Dickey 1987, introduction, chapters 6 and 7, Epilogue). All of this is encompassed in 
history or accomplished as part of historical development.  As a totality, history 
includes progress but also the costs, the suffering necessary to the learning process (see 
Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, chapter 5).  Here the natural order appears as a whole.  
There is no outside on which to displace the costs.  Hegel recognizes his philosophy of 
history as a theodicy, himself drawing the link to Leibniz (Hegel 1975, 42). 
  
Second, Adam Smith’s theodicy appears more complicated (and perhaps less coherent), 
but certainly more interesting also in that it both owns and denies the problem of 
suffering and evil in a good order.
8
  In my account, Smith’s justification of commercial 
                                                   
8 On Smith’s political economy as theodicy, see Long (2011) and Viner (1972).  Smith’s 
main mentor, Francis Hutcheson, contributed to the discussions launched by Bayle and 
society exhibits a complex and vexed structure, where (in some combination):  
(1) Like Leibniz, he re-values certain of these social failings or evils, including 
self-interest and inequality, as good or, at least, relatively good (see Blaney 
and Inayatullah, 2010, chapter 2; Hirschman 1977).   
(2)  But, unlike Leibniz and Hegel, he is tempted by dualism or Manicheanism. 
Like many market fundamentalists, Smith works to locate social suffering 
outside of his system of natural liberty, where individuals pursue their 
self-interest without regard to the good, yet produce the expansion of wealth 
and contribute to a more civilized society (Caporaso and Levine 1992, 
chapter 2).  Smith locates social suffering instead in the conscious pursuit 
of the good via government intervention in economic life, which, whatever 
the motive, impairs the system of natural liberty and creates costs. 
(3)  Yet, like Hegel, he accepts some of these social evils and failings (poverty, 
perhaps empire) as within his system of natural liberty and as a cost 
necessary to social advance (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, chapter 2).  
(4) Finally, like neoclassical economics and its derivatives, Smith disavows or 
hides from the necro-economic implications of his own thought, where he 
                                                                                                                                                     
Leibniz (Moore 2000) 
glosses over the human suffering generated by the insecurities of market 
distribution during times of famine and the population dynamics (infant 
mortality rates) associated with wage determination (Blaney and Inayatullah 
2010, chapter 2).  Since he can’t make his theodicy work fully, he resorts to 
denial. 
 
Though surely a critical reading of Smith, I would want to draw attention to the 
potential richness of Smith’s account of commercial society.  Though he can’t quite 
face fully the suffering essential to natural order, at points Smith does acknowledge 
these costs.  And, instead of offering us a valueless universe, he understands the 
revision of values associated with market society, including the politics of insulating the 
market from intrusive government.  
 
Finally, the various methodological or ontological individualists that I identify with 
rationalist IPE are distinct from Smith in that they repress the idea of the social whole or 
social ethical evaluations as having any ontological weight or reality.  This is Hume’s 
valueless universe.  The social exists only in the sense that it is a realization of 
individual preferences, traits and/or behaviors as they operate in a regular fashion 
(Caparaso and Levine 1992, 79-86).  Yet, the fact that individual interactions add up to 
desirable outcomes, via something like an invisible hand, suggests the continuing 
Providential or faith element in their thinking.    
 
Deborah Boucoyannis (2007, 709) lays out this intellectual edifice as it operates in IPE 
with great clarity.  She notes that the IPE “[u]tilitarians are the real radicals” in the IR 
discipline.  By assuming that “all preferences have a common denominator: rationality” 
and that “a bargaining space always exists, within which solutions can be found to 
reconcile initially competing demands, we can imagine a world in which harmony is 
possible.” As she notes, “Human interests are negotiable, divisible, and exchangeable.  
The concept of an indifference curve—whereby one good can be substituted for 
another—represents the measurable expression of this idea (with the important 
substitution of measurable preferences for utility).  These principles lead to the 
expectation, if not of a harmony of interests, at least of a possible bargain” involving 
mutual gains.  The global political economy appears as harmonious: an outcome of 
bargaining that may disadvantage some relative to others, in that they may find their 
preferences or demands less well fulfilled, but without serious insecurities or 
domination and without any real moral loss.  And with that move, we lose something 
of the richness of Smith’s political economy.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The turn to religion is now well established in IR (Mavelli and Petito 2012; Lynch 2009; 
Shani 2014).  Given events of the last several decades, a failure to react would have 
been a sign of malfeasance.  Yet, a more pressing question might be: how is it that 
religion was placed outside the boundaries of IR so that it had to be brought in? (Hurd 
2008).  This is a powerful question and answers help us understand the character of IR,.  
But I begin from a position that accepts Wight’s premise: IR has also always been in 
some sense theological. 
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It may be the case that even ten years ago the question posed in this collection would 
have been a very surprising - perhaps even a heretical - question to ask in the study of 
International Relations (heretical in the sense of challenging the secular 
self-understanding of the discipline). It is still probably a surprise for many scholars to 
hear the idea that there has been a ‘religious renaissance’ or ‘religious turn’ in the study 
of International Relations. This collection grapples with the idea that previously stable 
concepts, categories, or distinctions, which almost appear to those of us in Europe or the 
West as natural concepts or distinctions - what constitutes the religious, the sacred, the 
secular - and what constitutes the political or even the economic, have been de-centred - 
and, perhaps, even destabilized, by the impact on theory, and theorizing of the global 
resurgence of religion taking place in international relations. 
 
This contribution seeks to briefly begin to examine this decentring or destabilizing of 
established concepts, and their meanings, and its implications for the study of religion in 
international relations. It also points towards the implications for the theory of 
international relations, for the narratives of international history, and the history of the 
theory of International Relations. These research trajectories also have implications for 
how scholars, commentators, and policymakers interpret religion in contemporary 
international relations. 
 
The Religious Turn as a ‘Western Project’ in the Study of International Relations? 
What was interpreted towards the end of the twentieth century - perhaps, the last 
modern century (Thomas 2005:45) as empirical changes with the global resurgence of 
religion, eventually came to be seen as important for the study of International Relations. 
The discipline was (eventually) responding to the empirical changes - out there in the 
world, identifying the blinders, blind spots, regarding seeing what was new regarding 
religion, and what has always been happening in societies and communities embedded 
in religious traditions around the world.  In other words, the religious turn or the 
religious renaissance is in some sense a response to the global religious resurgence - as 
it should be, in a discipline which claims to be so relevant to policy making to the 
changing events in international relations (Buzan & Little 2000). A variety of scholars at 
the cusp of the new century successfully made the argument that religion was and is an 
important factor in international relations, and for a variety of reasons it has been 
ignored or marginalized in the study of International Relations (Haynes, 1994; Petito 
and Hatzopoulos 2000; Fox 2001; Thomas 1995, 2005). 
 
However, while this argument has now largely been accepted by a variety of scholars, 
commentators, and in public opinion, in retrospect it is clear that the religious turn, the 
religious renaissance, emerged mainly as an essentially Western project in three ways. 
The first way the religious turn was a Western political project was as a project of 
Western conceptions of international security - like much of International Relations 
itself, especially as a factor in debates in the early 1990s over international security and 
the causes of international conflict (i.e. the debate before September 11, 2001). 
Similarly, the resurgence of nationalism goes back to the 1970s, and also pre-dates the 
end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001. The world after the Cold War turned out 
to be a world of violence, and not a world of peace, democracy, and free markets, at 
least from an American perspective (Mandelbaum 2002). The brave new world after the 
Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall led to ethnic conflicts in and around Europe, in 
former Soviet states, and in the former Yugoslavia - surprisingly, unexpectedly, and 
confusingly for so many Westerners or Europeans influenced by theories of 
modernization and secularization. The accounts of these ethnic conflicts at first avoided 
the religious dimension, preferring the concepts of ethnic conflict, nationalist conflict, 
or ethno-national conflict. There was a reluctance to engage with the ‘religious’ 
dimension (however it was conceived to be). However, many Europeans still wondered 
what were the sources of the seemingly sudden surge of aggression (Palaver 2013:16-17, 
34). 
 
These theories, concepts, and assumptions contributed to the way religion, to use the 
concept of the Copenhagen School, has been ‘securitized’ in Western and European 
foreign policy, public opinion, and in scholarly discourse. Religion - and its secular 
‘Other,’ in International Relations came to be ‘ignored until the late 1990s by critical as 
well as conventional international relations, and then emerged as a factor almost 
exclusively in security debates regarding the causes of post-Cold War conflict’ (Lynch 
2015: 84). Early in the religious turn, I called attention to the ‘Westphalian presumption,’ 
i.e. the notion that religious and cultural differences cannot be accommodated in 
international public life, and this was part of ‘the political mythology of liberalism’ 
surrounding the wars of religion in early modern Europe. According to this political 
myth when religion politics are mixed together in domestic or international politics it 
inherently causes war, intolerance, devastation, political upheaval and perhaps the 
collapse of the international order. These assumptions often still underlies the European 
political imagination (Casanova 2008), and the debates over a variety concepts, such as 
‘religious violence,’ wars of religion, the clash of civilizations, and the ‘Westphalian’ 
international order (Thomas 2005). 
 
The second way the religious renaissance or religious turn was a Western project, is the 
way the religious turn has also partly been a response to the religious resurgence, but it 
is also part of efforts - more recent efforts, by a new generation of scholars of the 
religious turn, to “‘provincialize’ International Relations by bringing in voices from 
outside the West’ - or perhaps, what Pope Francis might call bringing International 
Relations in from ‘the margins of the world,’ and even starting to interpret the events in 
international relations from the perspective of the margins of the world rather than from 
the perspective of the great powers (Ferrara 2015). However, this clearly has 
implications for the future of international order, and even for the concept of 
international order - or at least a neo-liberal interpretation of it, and this is perhaps 
upsetting to those committed to both of these understandings of international order.  
 In other words, these considerations suggest the discipline should examine, or at least 
begin to examine, how religion in the study of International Relations may go beyond 
some of the more rigid, less socially constructed, conceptions of the ambivalence of 
religion - its role in violence or peace-making. They begin to indicate a way of seeing 
how religion may fit more broadly into moves ‘toward a post-Western IR’ (Shani 2008; 
Shani 2014), and into the ‘Worlding Beyond the West’ research programme (Tickner 
and Waever 2009). The bringing in of voices from the margins, or from the non-Western 
world (which, of course, only metaphorically, represents the margins of the world) 
really does mean bringing in the voices - increasingly voices from the religious world of 
the global South, which means bringing in the voices of the religious world of the 21st 
century. Moreover, this is also why the global religious resurgence is more wide spread 
than what is usually conveyed by the concept of religious fundamentalism in 
international relations. 
 
Therefore, is it possible the religious turn - beyond Western conceptions of it, given the 
religious world of the global South, might make an important contribution to developing 
a ‘post-Western’ International Relations, which deals with the issues, concepts, and 
concerns of the rest of the world (which at least by 2050 will comprise 90 percent of the 
people in the world). It is now more widely recognized that there is a need for a 
genuinely global study of International Relations. What the move beyond Western 
conceptions of the religious turn does is also begin to open a genuinely global study of 
global or international security. What is global is not only its scope – the world (e.g. the 
debate in the 1980s between ‘globalists’ and ‘regionalists,’ for example on political 
change in southern Africa), but also its link to non-Western concepts, security concerns, 
and communities, which could now have an impact on what and whom is being secured 
in global security.  Scholars from emerging great powers certainly have a larger 
contribution to make, but while these voices are important there is the problem this 
could simply lead to new voices, but still ones which echo the familiar forms of power, 
hierarchy, and hegemony. This was the problem with the call for a New International 
Economic Order in the 1970s. So, as before, a variety of voices, from a variety of 
peripheries, can still get marginalized in the discipline and in the world. It remains to be 
seen if the Catholic Church, with increasing composition from the global South, may 
come to represent these marginalized voices in international order - to the consternation 
of both the old Western great powers and new emerging ones (Allen 2009: 13-53, 
338-374). Moreover, if the concepts and issues that matter as part of a post-Western IR 
are more likely to gain greater recognition when it is done within the discipline of IR, 
given the religious world of the global South, then can the religious turn crucially 
contribute in new and different ways to a post-Western study of International Relations? 
(Shani 2008, Tickner and Waever 2009)?  
 
Thirdly, the religious turn in International Relations needs to be seen, and interpreted as 
a part of this much wider phenomenon in the study of the humanities and social sciences, 
which also includes theology and religious studies.  There is a ‘radical scepticism of 
traditional approaches to the field of cultural theory’ since until recently it was 
dominated by theories of secularization. Many scholars across the humanities and social 
sciences now question the tenability of such a unilinear story, narrative, regarding 
progress, modernization, and secularization to describe the global home of all of us. It is 
why the crisis of modernity, as a type of cultural criticism, is often connected with the 
global religious resurgence, and it is why the twentieth century was the last modern 
century (Palaver 2013: 15-32; Thomas 2000, 2005). 
 
The variety of foreign policy concerns - the religious resurgence, and what is now 
branded as ‘religiously motivated’ violence - war, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, are all  
factors which have been ‘pushing the concept of religion back into the foreground of 
sociological debate’ (Palaver 2013:17). This is a position central to the religious turn in 
International Relations, but these three points also indicate why the ‘political’ 
resurgence of religion needs to be more broadly connected to its social, cultural, 
religious, and economic dimensions in states and societies around the world.  
 
This is also why sociological debate does not stop at this limited political recognition of 
religion, perhaps since it has wider interests, at different levels of analysis, in how the 
sacred, the secular, and modernity relate in cultures and societies around the world. The 
religious resurgence also includes the spread of sects, cults, and other forms of religious 
experience. ‘In the modern world, for example, there has been a marked increase in 
practices of the occult, including sects, magic, and the esoteric. This growing need for 
religious experience on the individual level has carried political consequences in 
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, where social pressure has led the governments to 
use state aid in an attempt to control the growth and proliferation of sects’ (i.e. the 
attempt by European governments to define the concept of religion, and so definitions 
have political significance (Palaver 2013:16).  
  
Towards New Concepts in the Religious World of the Twenty-first Century 
The modern concept of religion is now widely challenged in a variety of disciplines. 
Many scholars in anthropology, sociology, theology and religious studies argues there 
can be no universal concept of religion. It is a construction of European modernity, and 
its constituent elements go back to the Renaissance and Reformation (Asad 1993). Later 
on, the modern concept of religion influenced European imperialism. It was exported to 
deny indigenous peoples their religion, and then to help rule them (Cavanaugh 2009: 
57-102, 85-101; Masuzawa 2005). These are important arguments for a discipline that 
claims to be ‘international’ in the religious world of the twenty-first century, and they 
are also important for developing a post-Western IR.  
 
What these disciplines in the humanities and social sciences indicate is the way the 
concept of religion has returned to the foreground of scholarly debate, and so a variety 
of phenomena, including the international events mentioned here, point to the need for 
theory to better understand the role of the sacred, the role of religion, in political life and 
in economic life, as part of the role of religion in general human existence (Palaver 
2013:17). International Relations is only one part, although an integral part of this 
understanding of the way the sacred, the secular, the religious function in the 
twenty-first century. It is what makes these concepts an important part of what ideas and 
social groups are securitized  or scapegoated (and which ones are not) in domestic 
politics, foreign policy, and international security (Thomas 2014; Thomas 2015). 
 
These disciplines argue that substantive definitions of religion are exclusivist, based on 
the content of the religion - specific doctrines concerning gods, the sacred (so religion is 
often reduced to a religious ideology or political theology), and functional definitions 
have an expansive or inclusive idea of what religion is. Functional definitions focuses 
on what religions do in society – they create awe, division, solidarity, meaning, or a 
sense of what is of absolute or of ultimate concern.  
 
What is often rejected is a functional, expansive, definition of religion, i.e. the idea that 
a variety of ideologies - like Marxism, capitalism, liberalism, or nationalism can be 
religions, even though they may share some of religion’s characteristics. So nationalism, 
and virulent forms of nationalism like Hindu nationalism are excluded as a type of 
religion. It is argued rather straight forwardly, ‘religion is something distinct, even if it 
sometimes shares characteristics with other forms of belief and belonging.’ ‘Religion’ is 
about ideas, beliefs, doctrines (religious ideologies or political theologies), and 
‘religious actors’ are those that identify with one of the world religions (Duffy Toft 
2011: 21-24).  
 
When the category of religion is expanded to include almost any or set of practices that 
can function as a religion it is argued the concept should be replaced by other categories 
- but, that is the problem, it obscures what really should be illuminated by political 
analysis. It allows the ‘securitizing’ of religion, or the scapegoating of religion, in ways 
that leave aside any critical analysis of (allegedly) secular practices in international 
relations. Labelling something as ‘religious’ (or really ‘Islamic’?) can be used to 
legitimate the use of our good (secular) violence against their bad (religious) violence, 
and the good thing about our good violence is that it helps reinforce our patriotic 
adherence to the nation-state, which saves us for our other, more divisive, identities 
(Cavanaugh 2009: 12). Why is it, at least in the West, there is talk about Hamas or 
Hezbollah - and ‘Islamic terrorism,’ but the activities of the Israeli settler movements 
are not called ‘Jewish terrorism?’ Moreover, this kind of analysis of religion and 
violence helps to reinforce the cycles of violence, and also obscures a larger reality - 
there are plenty of Jews and Muslims opposed to violence, and the violence of their 
respective communities. 
 Substantive definitions, in contrast to functional ones, are much easier to use for 
scholars of international relations. It allows them to deal with religion in a 
straightforward manner, and so substantive definitions of religion have established the 
mainstream research agenda regarding religion and International Relations: what factors, 
under which conditions, does religion cause or contribute to violence or to peace? Only 
those issues that are apart of what critical theorists call problem-solving theory - 
religious terrorism, religious civil wars seem to be a part of this agenda.  
 
Substantive definitions of religion are necessary to establish the allegedly essentialist 
characteristics of religion - it is divisive, absolutist, and non-rational to clearly 
distinguish between secular and religious violence. It is also argued political theology 
(e.g. ideas like cosmic war, just war, crusade, martyrdom) reinforces this distinction 
since it also legitimates sacrificial violence. Security specialists use these distinctions to 
invent new categories like ‘religious civil wars’ and ‘religious terrorism,’ and concluded, 
not surprisingly given the initial assumptions, they are more deadly, inflexible, and 
irrational, and so less prone to peace, negotiations, and compromise (Duffy Toft 2011: 
121-146; Hoffman 1995: 271-280, Moghadam 2006: 707-729).  
 The problem is that constructing criteria that are substantive and essentialist separate 
culture, religion, and nationalism from religion, and ignore how the politics of origin, 
place, identity, and meaning function in modern culture, politics, and society. The 
modern preoccupation with autonomy, meaning, and authenticity - are intelligible as 
roots are being lost through modernization and globalization. The call for a return to 
roots through nationalism, religious fundamentalism, or a religious resurgence (or all 
indeed together), are distinctively modern projects of retrieval and construction, and are 
attempts to grapple with the central problems of modernity - identity, authenticity, and 
meaning (Kratochwil 2011: 241-261). Therefore, the idea nationalism only shares some 
of the essentialist characteristics of religion (which is correct) ignores how nationalism 
functions in the culture of modern societies. It should be recognized for what it is - ‘the 
god of modernity,’ going back to the state-building publicists Bodin, Locke, and Hobbes 
(Llobera 1996). Indeed, if nationalism can be described as a type of ontology, i.e. a 
doctrine about the essence of reality, then it surely functions with the same kind of 
nonrational, transcendental, sense of awe, passion, and devotion narrowly attributed to 
substantive definitions of religion (Kapferer 1989).  
 
Constructing substantive, essentialist criteria of religion also ignores how the market 
can function in modern cultures and societies. There has not been a sustained 
engagement in the religious turn with how the sacred, the religious, and the secular are 
related to the ways the state can concentrate power and dominate society (in the extreme 
as a type of political religion), and also the way the market economy can concentrate 
capital, and transform society into a market society (in the extreme as a type of 
economic religion) (Cox 1999; Cavanaugh 2008). These concerns have been central to 
the rise of critical theory, and the Frankfurt school’s criticisms of culture, capitalism, 
and consumerism.  
 
However, these concerns are central to a set of theological criticisms of idolatry (i.e. the 
worship of false gods) which fit with the conception in the critical theory of IR as 
negative (or prophetic) critique, and theory as every day social practice, i.e. each of us 
every day live out a theory of international relations (Zalewski 1996: 340-353). In these 
conceptions of theory the social, the political, and the economic are not so separated, 
and there is concern for the social and economic consequences of poverty, inequality, 
social exclusion, and marginalization. Moreover, beyond negative or prophetic criticism 
(as if religion is mainly about ethics, or what Weber called value rationality), these 
concerns have also been a part of Franciscan economic thought (a type of what Weber 
called the formal rationality of consensual scientific knowledge) (Thomas 
2005:108-109). This is the Franciscan study going back to the thirteenth century of the 
way the market, the way economics operates, and can operate in society (with its 
emphasis on civic markets and the common good), and modern Catholic social teaching, 
seen most recently in the teaching of Benedict XVI and Pope Francis (Zamagni 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
These arguments in many ways go to one of the central problems of the forum - the 
religious turn in the study of International Relations has occurred at the same time many 
scholars of theology and religious studies argue religion as a category or concept - 
separate from the secular, the social, the political, or the economic does not exist but is 
a construction of the West. This is to the dismay of many scholars who argue this makes 
the concept of religion meaningless, and have tried for so long for religion to be taken 
seriously in the study of International Relations (Shah 2012:12). One response has been 
to let many flowers bloom, and a variety of scholars adopt their own definitions of key 
concepts. However, if there is no consensus on what is being studied, and what is 
distinctive about religion, then what is the significance of the research conclusions, and 
their policy implications - on religion and peace, violence, democracy, human rights, 
humanitarianism, or economic development?  
 
In fact, this kind of reaction seems to be embedded in the Western Enlightenment - 
which has been important for the development of a number of abstract concepts, such as 
religion, the sacred, the secular, humanity, and emancipation. Some aspects of the 
religious turn may represent the kind of sharp distinctions between the levels of analysis, 
and ‘excessive abstractions’ over the sacred and the secular, which more generally can 
be criticised as characteristic of the study of International Relations (Cho and 
Katzenstein 2011: 168-199).  
 
Moreover, it is not ‘religion’ within which most individuals and communities around the 
world live and shape their lives, it is through specific cultural and religious traditions 
and communities (Thomas 2005; Shani 2014). This forum can be interpreted as part of 
the process in this critical reflection that opens up new directions for the study of 
religion and International Relations. ‘There is nothing inherently sacred or profane,’ as 
Jonathan Z. Smith famously says. ‘These are not substantive categories, but rather 
situational or relational categories, mobile boundaries, which shift according to the map 
being employed. There is nothing that is sacred in itself, only things sacred in relation 
(Smith 1988: 55). So what counts as religious, secular, political, or economic in any 
given context is not only socially, but is also politically constructed. It is a function of 
different configurations of power surrounding the construction of the categories: the 
religious, the secular, and the political, and the boundaries between them. In a research 
agenda this is what should interest scholars of International Relations, and scholars of 
religion and International Relations.  
 
Moreover, these distinctions are also especially relevant to the study of global security 
since substantive definitions, essentialist characteristics, used to distinguish between 
what is labelled – and by whom, and in whose interest, as secular or religious actors and 
secular or religious violence can actually obscure what should be investigated - the role 
of politics and power in how, and in whose interests the concepts, the categories of 
religion, the secular, politics, or even economics are used and constructed. Ideas have 
consequences. Every Republican presidential candidate, for example, made a sharp 
distinction between ‘religion,’ ‘politics,’ and ‘economics’ in their opposition to Laudato 
Si, Pope Francis’s encyclical, which the press called an encyclical on climate change, 
but which Francis called a social encyclical since global warming was only a symptom 
of a deeper malaise in society, a cultural and economic worldview which affects the way 
we live, and puts short-term economic gain before people and the planet (Valley 2015). 
In other words, what critical theorists call everyday social practice, and so functional 
definitions make it easier to probe more deeply into how the sacred, the secular, and 
violence can be related to cultural politics - the politics of how the sacred, the secular, 
and violence function in any society and not only those which are the Western object of 
foreign policy, international security, or humanitarian intervention. 
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